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Are resource-abundant economies disadvantaged?
{
Kym Anderson*
Economies well endowed with natural resources relative to other factors of production
have grown slower than other economies over the long term. In reviewing possible
explanations for this, the article ¢nds unconvincing such common suggestions as
declining terms of trade and rising restrictions to primary product markets abroad. It
suggests the most likely reason is these countries' own distortionary policy regimes.
Recent reforms in some resource-rich economies are already yielding growth
dividends. The article also examines the impact of the greening of world preferences
and politics on the prospects for resource-abundant economics.
This article re£ects on two recent developments in our profession as they
relate to Australia and its primary producers. One stems from the renewed
interest in national economic performance (as re£ected, for example, in
demands for reduced government intervention in markets), which has
stimulated economists to seek better explanations of why economic growth
rates di¡er between nations. That research has, among other things, raised
again the question of why economies well endowed with natural resources
relative to labour and other capitalöincluding Australia but also many low-
income economiesöappear to have performed relatively poorly over the long
term. The other development is the burgeoning interest globally in environ-
mental issues (broadly de¢ned to include safe food and freedom from exotic
pests and diseases) and the accompanied calls for more government
intervention because of the externalities involved.
This demand for more environmental policies may at ¢rst seem at odds
with the general desire to reduce the role of governments. But it takes only a
moment's re£ection to realise that these two developments are not
inconsistent. Reducing governmental distortions to markets boosts national
income, and income growth boosts the demand for all normal goods and
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International Economic Studies at the University of Adelaide, Australia.services, including a clean environment. If a cleaner environment is not only
a normal good but a superior one (in the sense that its income elasticity of
demand exceeds unity), all the more reason to expect income growth to
generate demands for better environmental outcomes. Furthermore, if
reducing government-induced wastage improves the e¤ciency of resource
use, that is consistent with more environmental consciousness. There is,
however, a real risk that heavy-handed or otherwise inappropriate environ-
mental policy responses could undermine the gains from other economic
reformsöand even be environmentally counter-productive.
Important aspects of both developmentsöthe demand for better economic
performance particularly through reducing government activities and
regulations, and the demand for government initiatives to better protect the
environmentöare their international dimensions. In the ¢rst case, economic
rationalism has contributed to large-scale liberalisations of trade in goods,
services, ¢nancial capital and technologies in many parts of the world during
the past decade or so; and in the second case, we have heard calls for
international environmental agreements and for guarantees that freer
international trade and investment will not harm the environment. Since
those international dimensions are likely to continue to grow in importance,
they are a particular focus of attention in what follows.
The article ¢rst re£ects on why economies well endowed with natural
resources relative to labour and other capital (hereafter referred to as `resource-
abundant' or `resource-rich' economies) have grown slower than resource-poor,
denselypopulatedones over recentdecades.Thisissueisnotto be confusedwith
the issue of convergence of per capita income levels across countries, because
here resource richness is referring to di¡erences not in aggregate abundance of
resources (and hence not in per capita incomes) but rather in national resource
endowment ratios. The article then looks at how the greening of politics that
accompanies income growth is altering policies and thereby a¡ecting future
prospects for resource-rich economies such as Australia's. In both sections
questions are being raised as much as answers given, but hopefully those
questionswillstimulatenewempiricalresearchonyet-to-beresolvedissues.
1. Why have resource-rich economies grown relatively slowly?
The world's fastest growing economies in recent decadesöJapan, Hong
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and more recently Chinaöare all
densely populated. That is, they are poorly endowed with natural resources
relative to labour. In particular, they have very little agricultural land per
worker. By contrast, among the slowest-growing of the more advanced
economies this century have been land-abundant Argentina, Australia and
New Zealand, not to mention the slower-growing, land-abundant, low-
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generally, statistically very signi¢cant negative relationships have been found
between GDP growth rates and indexes of comparative advantage in natural
resource-based products. Sachs and Warner (1995), for example, explore
regression relationships between GDP growth from 1970 to 1989 and the
ratio of resource-based exports to GDP in 1970 for a sample of 97
developing countries, and ¢nd the latter to be a signi¢cant explanation of the
former, whatever other exogenous variables are included in the regressions.
Anderson (1995a) explores a slightly longer period with both wealthy and
developing countries, using as a comparative advantage index an estimate of
food self-su¤ciency ratios in the early 1980s at free-trade prices. That too
was highly negatively correlated with GDP growth since 1970.
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One possible explanation for this negative relationship is that easy riches lead
to sloth. The sixteenth-century French political philosopher, Jean Bodin
(1576), asserted that: `Men of a fat and fertile soil are most commonly
e¡eminate and cowards; whereas contrariwise a barren country makes men
temperate by necessity, and by consequence careful, vigilant, and industrious.'
It is not clear how Bodin perceived the impact on women's e¡orts, but in any
case I suspect di¡erences in inherent slothfulness per se (as distinct from
inactivity induced by government policies that dampen incentives) are likely to
provide at most only a minor part of the explanation for growth rate
di¡erencesöalthough I'm not sure how that claim could be tested empirically.
Another often-claimed and related explanation for growth rate di¡erences
is cultural determinism. A journalist from the London newspaper The Times,
who was travelling in Asia in the mid-nineteenth century, reported that the
country he was in was inhabited by a homogeneous race of lazy people
whom he believed were incapable of ever being industrious. An Australian
consultant visiting the same country in 1915, to report to its government on
its workers, wrote:
My impression as to your cheap labour was soon disillusioned when I
saw your people at work. No doubt they are lowly paid, but the return is
equally so; to see your men at work made me feel that you are a very
satis¢ed easy-going race who reckon time is no object. When I spoke to
some managers they informed me that it was impossible to change the
habits of national heritage [emphasis added].
2
1See also Gelb and Associates (1988) and Auty (1990), who note the poor performance
of many oil-rich developing countries since 1973.
2As quoted in Bhagwati (1983), with thanks to Justin Lin for bringing it to my
attention.
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was Europe and not Asia that enjoyed the ¢rst few centuries of industrial
growth (Jones 1981), make nonsense of the opposite claim that rapid
economic growth is peculiar to Asian or Confucian cultures.
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Some other common hypotheses that are more narrowly in the economic
or political economy realms deserve more consideration. One, popularised
by Prebisch (1964)öand contrary to the fear of Malthusians and other
doomsdayersöis that resource-abundant economies face continual decline in
their terms of trade. Another is the assertion that there are more growth-
inducing factors associated with manufacturing industries than primary
production. A third is that resource-poor economies have more scope to
grow via technological catch-up. And a fourth is that the exporters of
resource-abundant countries face larger protectionist barriers abroad than
do exporters of non-primary products. Each of these is explored in turn, after
which consideration is given to the possibility that policies are more
distortionary in resource-abundant economies.
1.1 Deteriorating terms of trade
The price of primary products relative to manufactures in international
markets appears to have been on a long-run decline for a century or more
(Grilli and Yang 1988). Even when more sophisticated adjustments are made
to the data to take into account greater improvements in the quality of
manufactures, as Lipsey (1994) did recently, that tendency is only weakened
rather than reversed. What explains that downward trend?
The most commonly suggested explanation is that the demand for primary
products, particularly food at the farm-gate level, is income and price
inelastic. The logic is captured in ¢gure 1. Consider a frictionless world
economy with just two goods A and B (primary and non-primary products).
Assume that it is growing because of improvements in productivity, and
suppose for a moment productivity growth is equally rapid in the two
sectors. Then the global supply curves for the two goods would shift out at
the same rate. In ¢gure 1 the supply curves in the ¢rst period are assumed to
coincide, hence they would still coincide in the second period after the
productivity growth but be further to the right. The income boost resulting
from that productivity growth would shift out the global demand curve for
each good, but by less for good A (primary products) whose demand is less
income elastic. In the illustrated example, the price of A relative to B would
3A slightly more plausible cultural explanation is that ethnically diverse countries might
su¡er from low levels of trust that reduce investments, as in parts of Africa (Easterly and
Levine 1995).
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terms of trade for sellers of primary products. Thus economies with a
comparative advantage in primary products would grow less rapidly than
other economies. For that relative price decline not to occur, given the
di¡erences in income elasticities, the slower growth in global demand for
primary products would need to be matched by slower growth in their global
supplyöbut then resource-rich economies (those whose primary sectors are
relatively dominant) still would be growing slower, because of slower
aggregate output growth.
The relative price of primary products would decline even more if there
were relatively faster growth in their supply, for example, because of faster
productivity growth in primary sectors. In that case, the lower price elasticity
of demand for primary products would contribute too. Figure 1 shows that
if the primary products supply curve shifted from Sao not to SA1 but SA1',
then the relative price of primary products would fall even more. In the
example illustrated, that price ratio would fall from 1 not to 0.77 but
65=115  0:57, representing a 43 per cent deterioration in the terms of
trade for primary producers. That greater price decline may mean real
incomes of resource-rich economies still grow slower than those of resource-
poor economies, despite the greater output of primary products.
Figure 1 Changes in supply and demand for primary and non-primary products in a grow-
ing economy
Source: Adapted from Tyers and Anderson (1992, p. 31).
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primary production is rejected out of hand by many people. After all, they
say, why would labour be drifting from primary to secondary and tertiary
sectors if the former was experiencing faster productivity growth? That
ignores the distinction between total and labour productivity growth,
however. It happens that agricultural technologies have proven to be very
malleable, becoming more labour-saving as the relative price of labour rises
(Hayami and Ruttan 1985). So substituting land, other forms of capital, and
other inputs for labour could be a su¤cient explanation for the decline in
agriculture's share of employment, leaving unanswered the question of which
sector has the faster total factor productivity growth.
Two recent empirical studies have examined total productivity growth
rates for di¡erent sectors across a large number of industrial countries for
the 1970s and 1980s (OECD 1995; Bernard and Jones 1996). Both ¢nd a
much higher rate of TFP growth for agriculture than for other sectors.
Bernard and Jones report an average TFP growth rate of 2.6 per cent for
agriculture compared with 1.2 per cent for industry, with only one of their
sample OECD countries having TFP growth higher for industry than
agriculture. An even more recent study, by Martin and Mitra (1996),
examines new data for a much larger and more diverse sample of countries
(almost 50 countries, two-thirds of them developing) for the quarter century
from 1967 to 1992. They also found agriculture's TFP growth rate around
twice that for manufacturing, with the di¡erence being larger for developing
countries but minor for OECD countries.
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An important contributor to rapid productivity growth is the speed with
which new technologies can be imported, adapted and adopted. The
international dissemination process may be even faster in primary
production than in manufacturing. In mining this is because multinational
corporations are typically needed to successfully develop large-scale mines,
and they bring with them the latest appropriate technology or sometimes
develop it on site (witness the innovative, capital-intensive operations of
some of the multinational activities in Papua New Guinea, for example). In
agriculture it can happen because of agroecological similarities. A recent
study by Byerlee and Traxler (1996) found that international spillovers from
agricultural research are pervasive, and considerably greater than previously
perceived.
Even if evidence on relatively rapid productivity growth in primary sectors
is accepted, many people still reject the idea that primary production can
4Nor has TFP growth in mining and mineral processing been slow. See, for example,
Tilton (1997).
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namely, the ¢niteness of the natural resource base on which that production
depends. There is only so much land that can be farmed or forested, or water
that can be ¢shed or used for irrigation, or fuels and minerals that can be
mined. Thus in terms of ¢gure 1, proponents of this view would say that in
the long run, even if productivity growth were faster in the primary sector,
the rightward shift of SAo would eventually lag behind that of SBo because the
supply of one or more of its sector-speci¢c primary factors is inelastic.
But the evidence casts doubt on the validity of this view as well.
Technological developments continue to drive down the relative economic
importance of natural resources in primary production. Farm chemicalsö
much maligned by some conservationistsöraise crop yields and thereby
reduce the arable land area needed to produce a tonne of grain. Intensive
broiler, egg, and pig sheds and cattle feedlotsöcriticised by animal
liberationistsöreduce enormously the amount of land that would otherwise
have to be trampled by cattle and sheep rather than cropped if all our meat
supplies had to be grass-fed. Huge technological strides are also now being
made that are changing ¢shing from a crude hunter-and-gatherer activity to
high-tech deep-sea operations and ¢sh farming (aquaculture). Dripper and
other new irrigation techniques and more sensible pricing policies are making
ever more e¤cient use of water in agriculture too. The technologies for
mineral exploration, exploitation and processing continue to become more
capital-intensive also. Beckerman (1992) notes, for example, that world sales
of many minerals during the past 25 years have exceeded known
commercially recoverable reserves around 1970, yet today's `known reserves'
exceed those of 25 years ago, despite the fact that the real price of minerals
has trended downwards! In short, primary production, no less than and
possibly even more than manufacturing and services, is becoming ever more
intensive in the use of capital and intermediate inputs. This relative decline
in the importance of land, water and mineral resources in primary
production is likely to continue to erode the validity of the assertion that
supply curve shifts cannot contribute to the explanation for the decline in the
terms of trade for economies exporting natural resource-based products.
This review raises numerous empirical questions. For example, to what
extent is the decline in the relative price of primary products in
international markets due to a relatively rapid (or despite a relatively slow)
outward shift in their supply curve as compared with the relatively slow
growth in their demand (notwithstanding continuing population growth)?
5
5The relative unimportance of population in this story is explained convincingly in
Johnson (1997).
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products, to what extent is that output increase o¡setting the drop in the
relative price of primary products in terms of its impact on real incomes of
resource-rich economies? It is quite possible that if primary sectors are
enjoying relatively fast productivity growth for whatever reason, then this
could be a reason to expect resource-rich economies to be growing more
rather than less rapidly than other economies, provided the consequent
change in the terms of trade were not too severe. The latter implies there is
a premium on rapid adoption of new technologies, with those innovative
resource-rich economies able to remain at the forefront of primary sector
technology potentially doing well. My hunch is that the declining terms of
trade for primary exporters could explain at most only a small part of the
relatively lack-lustre growth performance of resource-rich economies, but
that still needs to be tested empirically. If that is too di¤cult to do
econometrically, it might be worth at least exploring possibilities through
sensitivity analysis using a forward-looking global simulation model such as
GTAP.
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1.2 More growth-inducing externalities in industry?
Let me turn now to the assertion, beginning with Adam Smith and David
Ricardo, that there are more growth-inducing externalities associated with
manufacturing industries than with primary production. Marshall (1890),
for example, suggested this was because manufacturing was subject to
increasing returns whereas primary production faced decreasing returns.
Hirschman (1958) stressed the greater contribution of manufacturing via
linkages. This idea was revived recently by Matsuyama (1992) using a two-
sector model in which manufacturing is characterised by learning-by-doing
that is external to the ¢rm but internal to the sector, an idea extended by
Sachs and Warner (1995) for a `Dutch disease' model with a third sector
producing non-tradable services. But this extension begs the question of
why services (not to mention primary productsöconsider biotechnologies,
for example) might not have learning-by-doing properties as assumed for
manufacturing. If services did have those properties, a contraction of
manufacturing following a primary sector boom need not slow the growth
of a resource-rich economy as in the Matsuyama/Sachs and Warner
models. On the contrary, given that the income growth from the boom
would boost the demand for and hence production of non-tradable services
6See, for example, the grain productivity growth simulation in Anderson, Dimaranan,
Hertel and Martin (1997).
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if su¤ciently strongöcould ensure these economies grow as fast as or faster
than others. Hence the Matsuyama/Sachs and Warner ideas should be
treated simply as theoretical possibilities yet to be demonstrated
empirically.
1.3 More scope for technological catch-up in resource-poor economies?
This third possibility is based on the fact that relatively backward economies
able to readily borrow superior technologies from abroad are likely to grow
faster than those at the technological frontier whose productivity growth
depends more on indigenous investments in innovation. There is empirical
support for this as an explanation for the convergence of economic growth
rates around the world.
7 However, this possibility is likely to be of less
importance than is commonly presumed in explaining the slower growth of
resource-rich as compared with resource-poor economies, because each
group includes countries that are at or near the technological frontier and
ones that are less advanced. Since resource richness here does not refer to the
aggregate endowment of resources (as tends to be re£ected in per capita
income) but rather to the ratio of natural resources to other resources such
as labour and produced capital, technological catch-up could be an
explanation only if technological backwardness was negatively correlated
with resource richness in that ratio sense. Unfortunately, it is di¤cult to get
a reliable index of technological backwardness that is independent of other
possible explanations of growth rate di¡erences to test this (patent data
perhaps?).
1.4 Ever-higher protectionist barriers facing primary exports?
What of the fourth assertion, that natural resource-abundant economies
grow less rapidly because their exporters face ever-higher protectionist
barriers than do exporters of non-primary products? If this were a true
description of the pattern of distortions to world trade, it would simply be a
contributor to the deteriorating terms of trade mentioned above rather than
a separate factor. But is it a true description of that distortion pattern?
Certainly agricultural and coal protectionism in Western Europe and
7See, for example, Dowrick and Gemmell (1991), Fagerberg (1994), Eaton and Kortum
(1995), and Williamson (1995).
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New Zealanders the feeling that their growth opportunities are thwarted; but
many other primary products face few trade barriers. Also, resource-poor,
newly industrialising developing countries feel thwarted by OECD countries'
restrictions to trade in such items as textiles, clothing, low-priced cars and
steel; and services trade, in which many natural resource-poor high-income
economies have a comparative advantage, is still highly protected too (PECC
1995).
Would the removal of all policy-induced barriers to goods and services,
trade and investment globally make it easier or harder for resource-abundant
economies to keep pace with other economies? The agricultural and coal
protectionism mentioned above, for example, certainly lowers international
prices for those products. But the policies of many developing countries
depress their domestic prices and exports of these same primary products,
keeping their international prices higher than they otherwise would be.
OPEC, too, has indirectly supported international coal prices.
In the case of food products, empirical analysis by Tyers and Anderson
(1992, table 6.9) suggests the e¡ects of food policies of rich countries on
internationalfoodpriceshavebeeno¡setalmostexactlybythee¡ectsofopposite
policiesofpoorercountries.Preliminaryempiricalresultssuggestmuchthesame
could be true for coal (Anderson and McKibbin 1997). Whether this would
generalise if distortions to all product markets were removed simultaneously is
an empirical question that global CGE models could in principle address but, to
myknowledge,havenot.However,theaboveexamplessuggestthisisunlikelyto
be a major explanation of the relatively poor performance of resource-rich
economies. Nor are the trade policy reforms that are in prospect, following the
UruguayRoundandAPECfree-trade-by-2010/2020initiatives,especiallylikely
to favour either resource-poor or resource-rich countries. This is because of the
interdependencies that exist between groups of countries. For example, textiles
reforms will speed the structural adjustment of resource-poor developing
economiessuchasChinaawayfromprimaryproduction,whichinturnwillboost
China's growth in demand for primary imports from resource-rich economies
(Andersonetal.1997),sobothwilltendtobene¢t.
1.5 Above-average distortions at home?
With none of the above possibilities suggesting very strong reasons to expect
resource-rich economies to grow slowly, another explanation is required.
Might it mainly be that these economies have been more distorted than other
economies? This hypothesis is suggested not just by the new growth theories
but by virtually all the empirical evidence which shows that economies that
are less open to trade, investment and technology in£ows grow slower and,
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liberalisations gain the most.
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It is certainly true that resource-abundant countries protect their
manufacturers more than other countries at similar stages of development.
Australia and New Zealand are classic examples. So too are many low-
income countries of Africa and Latin America which tend also to limit
imports of foreign direct investment and discourage, through poorly
enforced intellectual property rights, the importation of new technologies.
One might argue by pointing out that land-scarce economies such as in
Western Europe and Northeast Asia also are highly protectionist, albeit of
their farmers and coal miners rather than their manufacturers. However,
there is a di¡erence between the protectionist stances of that group of
countries and at least the high-income resource-abundant countries: the
former are protecting a very small and declining portion of the tradables part
of their economies, whereas Australia and New Zealand have been
protecting the bulk of tradables production, namely manufacturing, and so
have harmed their economies more. Furthermore, many resource-abundant
developing countries have heavily discriminated against their primary sectors
with export taxes and overvalued exchange rates, which has harmed the vast
bulk of their tradables sectors too.
Given the abundance of strong empirical evidence showing that more
distorted economies grow slower, this may well be the main explanation for
resource-rich economies' relatively slow growth. If this is true, then the fact
that Australia and New Zealand along with many (particularly South
American) resource-rich developing countries are at last liberalising and
opening their economies bodes well for their futures. Whether they liberalise
su¤ciently rapidly to match the growth rates of the rest of the world's
economies, however, is a moot point and only time will tell. One encouraging
bit of information is the growth record of the past decade, which shows the
economies of Australia and New Zealand to be doing much better than the
OECD average. Certainly that piece of casual empirical evidence is at least
not inconsistent with the hypothesis that past distortionary domestic policies
rather than such things as the terms of trade or the nature of production
are to blame for slow growth in resource-rich economies.
This raises the intriguing political economy question as to why resource-
abundant countries in the past have adopted more distortionary policies, and
why those policies are now being dismantled in some but not all of those
8Williamson (1995) ¢nds that openness also a¡ects upwards convergence of living
standards: that occurred during the relatively liberal periods before the First World War
and after the Second World War, but the opposite (divergence) occurred in the protectionist
inter-war period.
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explain, among other things, inter-sectoral protection patterns across
countries,
9 but has not to my knowledge been used to explain di¡erences
between countries in the overall extent of distortion, nor the timing and pace
of reform. Analysts interested in doing so will ¢nd many suggestive ideas in
the literature. Of particular interest are the myriad papers on the
contribution of openness to the rapid growth of East Asia's resource-poor
economies; a set of papers focusing on the policy choices of many mineral-
exporting developing economies that have not performed well (but see the
critique by Davis (1995) of the references therein); and studies on why some
resource-abundant countries have chosen recently to radically reform their
economic policies (e.g., Williamson 1994).
2. How will environmental concerns alter growth prospects for
resource-rich economies?
10
With economic growth comes increasing demands for all normal goods and
services, including a cleaner environment (broadly de¢ned to include safer
food and freedom from exotic pests and diseases). Governments are thus
asked to impose tougher environmental standards as incomes rise. When this
is done, each industry's producers often think they are losing competitiveness
because of more stringent standards they must meet over time. However, this
is true only relative to a situation that excluded them but only them from
those tougher regulations. Typically, cost-raising standards will be rising in
numerous industries simultaneously, both at home and abroad, so it is not
inconceivable that an industry's international competitiveness could improve
even though it is being subjected to tougher regulations. Consider the e¡ects
of demands for higher environmental standards ¢rst on the comparative
advantages of di¡erent countries, and then on protectionism.
2.1 E¡ects on comparative advantages
If the adopted environmental regulations overcome environmental
externalities optimally (an important assumption to which I return below),
they can be thought of as just another determinant of comparative
advantage. In that case, rapidly growing economies might be expected to lose
9See, for example, Anderson (1995b), Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (1997), and the
references therein.
10This sections draws to some extent on Anderson (1997) and Stringer and Anderson
(1997).
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producing tradables whose production costs rise most because of tougher
environmental standards/regulations, other things being equal (Anderson
1992).
However, environmental standards are not likely to rise at the same rate
even in equally rapidly growing economies. Rather, the severity of
environmental regulations tends to be positively correlated with population
density, with the degree of urbanisation, and (possibly increasingly for
middle-income economies but then decreasingly) with the level of per capita
income.
11 For example, mining on the edge of a city or popular resort area is
likely to be subject to stricter regulations than mining in remote,
unpopulated areas; and farm chemicals are likely to be subject to stricter
environmental taxes in settings where farms are close to urban areas or
where chemicals would otherwise be used exceptionally heavily. This might
lead us to expect resource-rich, lightly populated economies on average to
have relatively lower environmental standards, and to have to raise fewer of
those standards or raise them less as incomes grow, than resource-poor,
densely populated economies with the same per capita income and growth
rate.
Furthermore, lightly populated resource-rich economies such as Australia
are relatively highly urbanised with a large non-tradables sector, for the
reasons we have become familiar with from booming sector theory (Gregory
1974; Corden 1984). Their concentration of non-primary activities in just a
few large cities means their stricter environmental standards are likely to
apply more to the urban-based industrial sector than to more remotely
located primary production.
One might be tempted to conclude from these quick thoughts that the
greening of preferences and hence politics will tend if anything to
strengthen export opportunities for resource-rich economies and their
primary producers. Even those in high-income resource-rich economies like
Australia might be better o¡ if their products and production processes,
through becoming `greener' to satisfy developments in local regulations and
preferences, give them a competitive edge over producers in developing
countries in the markets of other high-income countries where preferences
for `greener' products are strengthening.
However, an important assumption has been made above. It is that the
policies being progressively introduced to overcome environmental extern-
alities are optimal, that is, in the sense of equating at the margin social rather
11For empirical veri¢cation of the last of these correlations especially, see Grossman
and Krueger (1995) and the references therein.
Are resource-abundant economies disadvantaged? 13
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998than private bene¢ts and costs of each activity. Yet we know from experience
that environmental policies are typically far from optimal. Sometimes (too
often, green groups would say) governments delay or neglect to respond
adequately to community pressures to raise standards. And often when they
do respond, excessive and/or blunt command-and-control policy instruments
are used whose economic cost far outweighs any reasonable valuation of the
environmental bene¢ts. Partly this is because of inadequate policy advice but
much of it may be due to lobbying by vested interest groups. Explaining these
policy choices in terms of the economics of politics is an area ripe for more
research.
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Many examples could be given of inappropriate environmental policy
choices. At the international level one that immediately comes to mind that
is likely to harm Australia is the Framework Convention on Climate Change
aimed at reducing carbon emissions uniformly across (at least OECD)
countries. Far more appropriate to begin with would be to reduce existing
distortions in OECD energy markets. For example, lowering coal subsidies
and import restrictions would simultaneously improve the economy and the
environment (Anderson and McKibbin 1997). But let me conclude with a
few thoughts on the greening of trade protectionism and in particular on the
issue of quarantine.
2.2 The greening of protectionism
An important consequence of declines in traditional barriers to international
trade and investment is that domestic assistance policies are replacing
assistance previously provided via border measures. And with environment-
alism being politically correct, assistance in green garb has a reasonable
chance of not being challenged. Hence it is not surprising that there are
already European Union Council Regulations (e.g., No. 2078/92) allowing
environmental subsidies to agriculture, including subsidies to reduce the use
of fertiliser and pesticides, to promote environmentally sound production
methods, to encourage extensive agricultural techniques, to maintain
practices that are already compatible with the environment, and to assist
organic farming. These `Green Box' measures (as they came to be called
during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations) are likely to become more
substantial over time, substituting somewhat for traditional protectionism.
Hence monitoring their rise may be just as important as monitoring the
promised declines in traditional border protection, with a view to arguing
12Early political economy studies that focus on the impact that the greening of politics
would have on trade and environmental policies can be found in Anderson and Blackhurst
(1992, especially chapters 10 and 11).
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all may be optimal in many circumstances (Anderson and Leal 1991),
including situations where any politically feasible intervention would be so
far from ¢rst-best as to be worse than a free-market outcome.
Another consequence of international economic integration is that interest
groups are beginning to focus on other causes of comparative cost
di¡erences, including domestic environmental and technical product or
production process standards at home compared with abroad. The
motivation comes not just from a desire to reduce administrative and
conformance costs of meeting agreed international standards, and to counter
the greater risk of exotic pests and diseases being spread as countries trade
more. It also results, in the absence of harmonised standards, from concerns
of producers in high-standard countries that their costs of production for
some of their industries are higher than in countries with lower standards,
thus causing them to be less competitive.
This generates two sets of pressures in high-standard countries. At the
domestic level, disadvantaged industries seek a lowering of standards and/or
protection from imports from low-standard countries. To prevent standards
being reduced, the promoters of high standards tend to support the call for
import protection, since that can both reduce the opposition by local ¢rms to
higher standards at home and increase the incentive for foreign ¢rms and
their governments to adopt higher standards abroad. However, because such
uses of trade policy are both discriminatory and protectionist, they
contravene GATT rules and thereby erode the global trading system.
Fortunately, in the ¢rst case of this type to come before a GATT dispute
settlement panel (the infamous United States^Mexico tuna/dolphin case),
the panel ruled against the use of import restrictions.
13 But other cases are
bound to arise. Countries such as Australia with a vested interest in
maintaining a strong rules-based multilateral trading system need to argue
13When animal welfare groups succeeded in getting US legislation to ban the use by
American ¢shermen of dolphin-unfriendly nets to catch tuna in the Northeast Paci¢c,
Mexican tuna imports expanded rapidly so those groups sought, successfully, to get a ban
on tuna imports as well. The import ban was an extraordinarily heavy-handed action,
particularly since only a subset of US consumers care greatly about how tuna are caught.
Once the GATT ruled that the import ban infringed on Mexico's legal trade rights,
alternative solutions were sought. Eventually the import ban was dropped and `dolphin-
friendly' labelling of cans was introduced. US consumers could then choose whether to pay
extra for cans so labelled, and Mexican ¢shing £eets could choose whether to incur the extra
costs of production and compliance in order to sell certi¢ed cans at the higher price. Had
the GATT dispute settlement process ruled otherwise it would have opened up the
possibility of a £ood of uses of trade impediments to unilaterally impose the standards of
one nation (or more usually of one group within a nation) on other nations. Inevitably this
would lead to an escalation of trade disputes.
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example (see below regarding quarantine).
The other set of persuasive pressures generated by high-standard countries
impacts at the international level, namely for establishing or raising
minimum international environmental standards. For the reasons mentioned
above, what may seem desirable standards by one country may be seen as
excessive by others, particularly by people in countries relatively abundant in
natural resources per capita. Hence the latter have a strong interest in
ensuring the former do not dominate in the setting of international
standards.
To help calm this process, the Uruguay Round produced agreements on
Technical Barriers to Trade and on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (the latter speci¢cally to protect human, animal or
plant life or healthösee Stanton 1997). WTO members have a right to apply
their own standards, provided they are not inconsistent with the TBT and
SPS Agreements which includes not being unduly trade-restrictive. The SPS
Agreement establishes clear and detailed rights and obligations for
environmental health and food safety, as well as measures to prevent the
spread of pests or diseases among animals and plants. It outlines procedures
for product inspection, treatment and processing, risk assessment and
allowable maximum levels of pesticide residues and certain food additives
based on already agreed international standards (the Codex Alimentarius
Commission for food safety, the International O¤ce of Epizootics for animal
health, and the International Plant Protection Convention for plant health).
Members can adopt higher standards if they wish, but only with appropriate
scienti¢c justi¢cation. The TBT and SPS Agreements allow governments to
challenge, via the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, another country's food
safety or other technical requirements based on evidence showing the
measure is justi¢ed. Canada, for instance, is currently challenging Australia's
justi¢cation for sanitary measures banning salmon imports. Another
important food case that is currently before the WTO has to do with the
European Union banning the import of beef produced with the use of growth
hormones. The EU claims the ban applies to domestic producers and so does
not contravene the national treatment provision of the GATT, whereas the
United States argues that the hormones are not harmful to humans and
hence the EU standard is excessive and labelling should be su¤cient
protection for consumers. For the ¢rst time the WTO has called on scienti¢c
experts (including an Australian) to help resolve that case.
This is clearly an area where trade tensions could escalate. It is telling that
during the 47 years of the GATT, virtually no formal trade disputes on
SPS measures arose, because a country's import restrictions to protect
human, health and plant life were di¤cult to challenge under previous
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contrast, seven formal complaints had been lodged under WTO dispute
settlement procedures. The SPS Agreement is thus likely to help those
agricultural exporters who have been facing unduly restrictive barriers in
potential export markets abroad, and to reduce returns to those producers
who have enjoyed protection from import bans on quarantine grounds that
cannot be scienti¢cally justi¢ed. In the latter cases, removal of unjusti¢ed
import barriers could boost domestic consumer welfare by more than it
would harm domestic producer welfare, as well as boost producer welfare
abroad of course (the usual gains from trade liberalisation). From
Australia's perspective, getting rid of our own excessive quarantine
restrictions would also make it easier for us to argue with other governments
and in international fora for similar reforms abroad.
Economists have paid relatively little attention to this issue of technical
barriers to trade.
14 Now, however, is an opportune time for Australian
economists to make amends, following the release of the Nairn Report
(1996) which has brought the issue of quarantine at least under more of a
spotlight in Australia. Risk assessment based on empirical evidence is being
demanded increasingly in domestic policy debates and for the resolution of
international disputes. The Nairn Report correctly stresses the role model
Australia could play in developing state-of-the-art quantitative risk
assessment procedures. But if those procedures do not include all the relevant
economic e¡ects, inappropriately high standards will result. This is because
the main losers from excessive quarantine restrictions areöas with
traditional protectionismödomestic consumers and exporters at home and
overseas suppliers of the allegedly o¡ensive product, all of whom are
typically less in£uential than the industry (and sometimes environmental)
groups lobbying for the import barrier. The building in of appropriate
economic analysis in risk assessment procedures can help to correct that
imbalance, to the bene¢t of Australia and in particular its consumers and
exporters. Our exporters would be helped indirectly by less excessive
Australian quarantine restrictions potentially in three ways: (1) via the
standard general equilibrium e¡ects of reduced protectionism at home; (2)
via the export to other countries and such institutions as the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Body of a more complete risk assessment procedure that
ultimately would lead to less excessive quarantine restrictions to our export
markets abroad; and (3) via the enhanced position of Australia's trade
14Exception are Hillman (1991) and the International Agricultural Trade Research
Consortium which recently released a volume of studies on the subject (Orden and Roberts
1997). See also the recent conference paper on the Nairn Report by Tanner (1997).
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our potential export markets without appearing hypocritical.
Indeed, economic analysis at the outset of a quarantine inquiry might
even eliminate the need for expensive technical risk assessment in some cases,
for it might show that under no circumstances would quarantine restrictions
be justi¢ed. To see this, consider a simple example. Suppose, as with bananas
and chicken, Australia bans imports because it does not want to introduce
diseases that could raise domestic costs of production. What are the net
bene¢ts of that policy, and how do they compare with less extreme policies?
The most liberal alternative is to have no import restriction. (A less extreme
policy would be to tax imports and use the tax revenue to subsidise
producers to help them cover the now higher cost of disease prevention.)
The e¡ect of switching from a complete import ban to free trade is shown
in ¢gure 2. With an import ban S and D are the domestic supply and demand
curves and P is the domestic price under autarky. Economic welfare from
having this industry under these conditions is the sum of the consumer and
producer welfare triangles, abd plus cbd.
Suppose the price at the country's border is Pw, and that eliminating the
import ban risks introducing a disease that raises expected costs of
production in this industry (but has no other adverse e¡ects) such that the
supply curve intersects the vertical axis at a point above e (not shown). If
that happened, the local industry would disappear while consumers would
bene¢t from the price fall. In the absence of other externalities, national
economic welfare would change to age, which may be more or less than
S
Figure 2 E¡ects of altering quarantine import restrictions
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than or exceeds fgb. Thus, even in this extreme case, where disease
prevention costs decimate the industry, it could be economically more
bene¢cial to go to free trade than maintain the ban, namely when cfe is
smaller than fgb plus the indirect bene¢ts to exporters mentioned above. In
less extreme circumstances the free-trade alternative is even more likely to be
bene¢cial. One example is if the probability of disease importation is less
than 100 per cent, call it Q. In that case the expected bene¢t of moving to
free trade would be 1 ÿ Q:fgb  Q:fgb ÿ cfe, which is fgb ÿ Q:cfe and
hence is more likely to be positive the smaller is Q, the probability of disease
importation. Another example is if the supply curve's upward movement
after the ban is removed leaves it still intersecting the vertical axis below e,
as with S' in ¢gure 2. In that case the producer surplus is reduced not to zero
but to area hje, so it is only area cfjh rather than cfe that has to be less than
fgb to guarantee a net economic welfare improvement. That may be the case
either because disease prevention costs are moderate and/or because only
some growers/growing areas are vulnerable to the disease.
A conclusion that free trade is superior would be more likely the more
price elastic is S (and to a lesser extent D) below P, the larger the gap
between P and Pw, the lower the probability of disease importation, the
smaller the proportion of production that is vulnerable, and the lower the
cost of disease prevention (which could involve research to produce more
resistant varieties).
15 It happens that for many small industries such as
chickens or bananas, the domestic supply curve is fairly price elastic, because
the resources used in producing its product could readily be used in other
industries. The domestic demand curve also is often price elastic, because of
the presence of close substitutes in consumption. And in the cases of both
chicken and bananas, domestic prices are up to twice those observed in, say,
the United States, suggesting the gap between P and Pw is large for them.
Getting estimates of just these three parameters, the price elasticities of
supply and demand and the domestic-to-border price wedge, would allow an
a priori economic assessment that may demonstrate that no technical disease
risk assessment is required at all because the country would always be better
o¡ under free trade. Just as was the case with the tari¡ review in the 1970s,
perhaps it is time for Australiaöfor its own sake as well as to set a good
example to its trading partnersöto undertake a systematic economic review
of all its existing quarantine restrictions on imports. Both the Productivity
15Two standard caveats of welfare economics need to be kept in mind here. One is that
no one other than these producers is harmed by the disease that may be imported. The other
is that any people that are harmed are compensated by those who bene¢t from the freeing
up of trade.
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review, having recently been involved in reactive reviews in response to
requests from our trading partners.
16
3. Conclusions
This review has several implications for resource-rich countries such as
Australia. While many empirical questions remain unanswered, the evidence
available to date suggests a major explanation for the relatively slow growth
of such economies is not to be found in their declining terms of trade, or
di¡erences in positive spillover e¡ects from di¡erent sectors, or protectionism
abroad. Rather, a key explanation is likely to have been their own
distortionary policies. The attempt over the past decade or so to dismantle
such policies in Australia and New Zealand has certainly contributed to
shifting them from among the poorest-performing to among the best-
performing OECD economies. Completing that process of economic policy
reform and preventing policy reversals remains an ongoing challenge for
governments at both national and sub-national levels. This will be all the
more important the more other resource-rich economies such as in Latin
America move into reform mode, so as to maintain a competitive edge.
The growth in concerns for natural resource conservation and the
environment has the potential to raise the value of natural resources and
thereby enhance the economic prospects of resource-abundant economies.
But whether that potential is realised depends heavily on the policy choices
made by governments. Looking for free-lunch policy outcomes should be a
priority, where the economy and the environment are improved
simultaneously. The example at the multilateral level of reducing coal
subsidies and import barriers as a means of lowering carbon emissions is but
one reform that would help Australia directly. More usually there tends to
be a trade-o¡ between the economy and the environment. Even so, the trade-
o¡ need not be large. The example of quarantine restrictions may be a case
in point, where Australia's interests are quite possibly being harmed by its
own excessive regulationöespecially when account is taken of the impact
those regulations have indirectly on the country's ability to in£uence the
quarantine policies of our trading partners. Countries seeking to improve
their economic performance need to examine all such opportunities for
reform both at home and abroad.
16See, for example, the assessments for New Zealand apples (ABARE 1997) and
Canadian salmon (Industry Commission 1996). See also the more recent study of Australia's
banana import ban (James and Anderson 1998).
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